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The Concept of Time in Rehabilitation and Psychosocial Adaptation to Chronic 
Illness and Disability 
 Arguably, the most enigmatic of all human experiences may be the perception of 
time. Yet, time has also been viewed as the essence of human existence (Bergson, 1971; 
Kelly, 1955), as universally human (Doob, 1971), and as permeating all of human 
experience (Cottle & Klineberg, 1974; Melges, 1982). According to Zimbardo and Boyd 
(2008), time is the most common English noun (whereas year and day are ranked third 
and fifth, respectively). Time is also intimately interwoven into the most fundamental 
human perceptions of the internal and external worlds, such as causality, change, growth, 
maturation, order, self-awareness, and goal directedness (Frank, 1939; James, 1890; 
Kafka, 1973; Melges, 1982; Slife, 1993). It is therefore of ultimate importance for the 
meaning and significance we assign to events, objects, and other people (Sherover, 1975).      
 Still, many centuries of philosophical and psychological speculation and research 
have failed to resolve the ultimate time-related question, namely, is time a product of the 
mind (i.e., it is internally-derived, linked to one level of consciousness, and therefore 
phenomenologically-experienced) as Plato, Immanuel Kant, and Georg F. C. Hegel 
claimed, or is it rooted in the external world and, as such, is absolute and a product of the 
universe at large as Rene Descartes, John Locke, and Isaac Newton argued. Regardless, 
time is the prima facie of perceiving and experiencing nature. It is the, according to Kant, 
universal and fundamental form of all human sensibility. Indeed, it is that sui generis 
concept that is found not only between all events but mostly within all events, and as 
such is inseparable from space (Davies, 1995; Greene, 2004; Sherover, 1975). 
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 Time also plays an immeasurably important role during rehabilitation and 
adaptation to chronic illness and disability (CID). It has been linked, both indirectly and 
directly, to such concepts as: the process of adaptation (e.g., the arguable existence of 
universal or individual-linked stages or phases of adaptation), coping with CID-triggered 
stresses (e.g., anticipatory coping, coping with presently experienced crises, coping with 
the aftermath of CID), response shift models regarding reconstruction of past experiences 
and perceptions, and the impact of psychiatric disabilities (e.g., anxiety, depression, 
schizophrenia, personality disorders) on time orientation. To better appreciate how the 
understanding of time and its various aspects can facilitate the understanding of 
psychosocial adaptation to CID, the present two-part paper first seeks to (a) provide a 
brief review of the nature and structure of time and (b) explore the role that time plays in 
personality theories and therapeutic approaches. These areas are examined in part I of the 
paper. In part II the discussion reverts to a more rehabilitation-oriented domain and, 
accordingly, the second part: (a) briefly explores the literature on time, death, adaptation, 
and coping, (b)reviews the literature on the relationships between time and 
psychopathology, and (c) concludes with discussion of the complex relationships 
between the passage of time and psychosocial adaptation to CID, including a brief 
synopsis of interventions modalities recommended for time distortions. 
The Nature and Structure of Time 
 Humans typically view the concept of time as reflecting three separate, albeit 
dynamically interconnected, phases, namely, past, present and future. The complex 
interplay among these three phases can be appreciated from the fact that an event that has 
not yet occurred (future), is destined to be experienced at a certain point of time (present), 
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and eventually it fades into memory (past). Put differently, personal experiences, 
although belonging to all three time perspectives, ultimately are anchored in one only, the 
past. This unavoidable phenomenon stems from the simple order of life events, that 
whereas the future is “unknown” and certainly unpredictable, and is mostly fraught with 
either positive (e.g. hope, fantasies) or negative (e.g., anxiety, dread) anticipation, and the 
present is evanescent and continuously changing, the past, as the reservoir in which 
memories dwell, affords the individual the stability and immutability of reassessing life 
events (Cottle & Klineberg, 1974; Doob, 1971; Frank, 1939; Zimbardo & Boyd, 2008). 
Hartocollis (1972) further suggested that whereas the future can only be understood in 
terms of “potentialities” and is therefore avoidable to a degree, it is also the harbinger of 
anxiety. The past, in contrast, reflects events that have already occurred. It is therefore an 
inescapable and unavoidable finality. As such, it is often associated with experiences of 
depression and guilt (e. g., grieving lost opportunities, unfulfilled relationships, physical 
abilities).  
 The passage of time, however, transcends any simplistic efforts of demarcation 
into these three primary phases.  Regardless of how static or dynamic this tri-modal 
separation of time is, or how reasonable it appears to be, it still masks some very 
important and complementary influences among its aspects. For example, a distinction is 
often made between objective and subjective time (Adam, 1990; Edlund, 1987; 
Hartocollis, 1972; Henley et al., 2003; Melges, 1982; Pollock, 1971; Rappaport, 1990; 
Slife, 1993; Whitrow, 1987/2003). Objective time is typically equated with geophysical, 
public, rational, measureable clock-based, Newtonian time*. This time is conceived for 
the most part as linear (“the arrow of time”), continuous, uniform, universal, and 
Time and adaptation 
 5 
reductionist (for a comprehensive review of the assumptions underlying objective time, 
the reader is referred to Slife, 1993). This time exists independently of human 
consciousness. Still, even objective time is not viewed uniformly by all. Whereas 
classical, deterministic (i.e., both Newton’s and Einstein’s)  physics posit that the past 
and the future are solidly anchored into the present, quantum mechanics is based on a set 
of laws maintaining that predicting events in the future can only be probabilistically 
envisioned  and occurrences of the past can only be probabilistically reconstructed 
(Greene, 2004).   
Subjective time, in contrast, may be conceptualized as non-uniform, internally-
determined; private; experiential; affected by fleeting perceptions, emotions, and 
cognitions; is inherently elastic; and is partially determined by socio-cultural influences 
and values (Adam, 1990; Edlund, 1987; Melges, 1982; Slife, 1993). It is therefore, “felt 
time”. Accordingly, within subjective or psychological time, the experience of duration 
and flow of time may be shortened or extended, sequencing and ordering of events may 
be reversed, and as often experienced, thought processes can reverse to accommodate 
past events as well as be launched forward into the future (Frank, 1939; Melges, 1982; 
Piaget, 1969). Subjective time, therefore, does not conform to the more traditional orderly 
yet simplistic linear progression of clock time (past → present → future), but instead 
allows for a complex and often unpredictable interaction among various time aspects. 
The past, within the contest of subjective time is not a passive and immutable reservoir of 
memories but a sizzling and dynamic platform that is continuously changing as re-
emerging personal recollections reinterpret its contents (Berger, 1963; Cottle & 
Klineberg, 1974; Edlund, 1987). In a similar vein, anticipation and expectation of future 
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events, both positive (e.g., hopes, desires) and negative (e.g., fears, concerns), may affect 
the perception of meaningfulness of the present time as they serve to motivate or stagnate 
certain experiences and behaviors, and even the interpretation and reorganization of the 
past (Cottle & Klineberg, 1974; Edlund, 1987; Frank, 1939). Subjective time, then, is 
influenced by psychological defense mechanisms such as repression, distortion and 
denial (Pollock, 1971). It further allows us to project our lives into the future and also 
trace it back into the past (Edlund, 1987). As such, subjective time and meanings 
attributed to time-linked concepts are influenced by, and change with, age and life stage 
(Fingerman & Perlmutter, 2001; Lang & Carstensen, 2002; Lessing, 1972; Lomarz, 
Friedman, Gitter, Shmotkin, & Medini, 1985; Mello & Worrell, 2006; Shmotkin, 1991; 
Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999), social factors such as social goals and social comparisons 
(Carstensen, Isaacowitz & Charles, 1999; Jonas & Huguet, 2008) ; and even employment 
status (Feather & Bond, 1983; Bond & Feather, 1988; Martz, 2003). The subjective 
assessment of time has also been theorized to be linked to the type and extension of 
personal goals, such that expansive appraisal of the future is associated with the selection 
of long-term goals, notably the pursuit of knowledge-based goals while focus on the 
present is related to the selection of short-term goals, mostly of the affective domain, 
including emotional meaningfulness and satisfaction (Carstensen et al., 1999). It is also 
affected by and linked to a variety of personality characteristics (e.g., Type A personality, 
aggressiveness, self-esteem, ego control, optimism, motivation; Bond & Feather, 1988; 
Carstensen et al., 1999; Wessman, 1973) and psychiatric conditions such as anxiety, 
depression, schizophrenia and certain personality disorders (Doob, 1971; Edlund, 1987; 
Melges, 1982; Rappaport, 1990; Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999, 2008). Renowned physicists 
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such as Albert Einstein and Roger Penrose also recognized the existence of subjective 
(inner, psychological) time, as a separate entity from objective (outer, physical) time 
(Davies, 1995). Einstein further viewed time as an intellectual creation of the human 
mind that serves the purpose of inter-linking life experiences (Slife, 1993).    
Finally, the experience of time as a primary psychological functioning has been 
studied from four separate vantage points. These include: (a) Time Perception, which 
focuses on the individual’s ability to estimate or reproduce predetermined time units 
(several seconds, minutes, etc.); (b) Time Orientation, which focuses on the person’s 
preference for temporal direction or orientation (i.e., past, present, or future); (c) Time 
Perspective, which focuses on one’s timing and ordering of typically long-ranged 
(extended) personalized events, such as the projection of oneself into any of the three 
temporal dimensions and, therefore, functions as a mediator between the present and self 
and that of the past or future; and (d) Time Attitude, which reflects  the person’s attitude 
(negative, positive, neutral) toward the past, present, and future (Dilling & Rabin, 1967; 
Drakulic, Tenjovic, & Lecic-Tosevski, 2003;  Frank, 1939; Kastenbaum, 1964; Nuttin, 
1985; Wallace, 1956; Wallace & Rabin, 1960). In research and practice, however, it 
should be mentioned that clear distinctions among the above points of departure have 
often been blurred if not ignored all together.      
Linear and Cyclical Time    
 The belief that time progresses in a linear fashion is one of the primary 
cornerstones of Newtonian physics and Western civilization. This notion was espoused 
by such philosophers as John Locke (the objectivistic view of linear time or time that 
exists in the external environment), Emanuel Kant (the subjectivist or phenomenological 
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view of linear time or time that exists inside one’s mind, and Leibnitz (the notion that 
both time and space are relative and can be ordered such that the former is a universal 
order of change while the latter is the order of co-existing objects (Sherover, 1975; Slife, 
1993).  In contrast, the belief in cyclical time has often been linked to the rhythm of 
earthly phenomena (the annual seasons) and celestial objects (the periodicity of stars and 
planets in the night sky). The conflicting views regarding time’s linear vs. cyclical nature, 
in addition to being firmly entrenched in models of the presumed origin and end of the 
universe**, have also exerted a covert, yet omnipotent psychological impact on the 
relative importance of the past and the future. The past assumes a special and important 
role in cyclical models as it is often believed to repeat itself, while the future is accorded 
a prominent role in linear models as it points mainly in one direction (Whitrow, 
1972/2003).     
CID applications. The contrast between linear and cyclical time is prominently featured 
in the various models of psychosocial adaptation to CID, all of which heavily rely upon 
the notion that adaptation is a dynamic, unfolding and continuous temporal process 
(Livneh & Parker, 2005; Smedema et al., 2009). Earlier models of psychosocial 
adaptation emphasized the linearity of the adaptation process (i.e., the so-called “stage” 
or “phase” models) by maintaining that, following the onset of CID, the ensuing process 
is predictably composed of universal, uniform and trans-condition psychological 
experiences, reactions , or responses. It was further assumed that more distally 
experienced reactions, following CID onset, are securely predicated upon, and orderly 
follow, the emergence of more proximally experienced reactions. Although not directly 
addressed by the proponents of these models, it is assumed that it is psychological, 
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internally-determined time (rather than objective, rational time) that is at the root of these 
experienced reactions, their pace, and overall duration. These models, by their very 
nature, paid little or no heed to spatial (environmental) influences that may interact with 
these internally-driven reactions.  
 Cyclical (often referred to also as pendular) models of adaptation to CI, although 
far less encountered in the literature, have generally sought to address the clinical 
references to those observed alterations in experiences, as well as ‘identities” of people 
with CID. These alterations have spanned the gamut of viewing oneself as healthy vs. ill, 
disabled vs. nondisabled, engaging in adaptive vs. non-adaptive behaviors, and 
manifesting coping vs. succumbing attitudes (Charmaz, 1995; Wright, 1983; Yoshida, 
1993). According to the pendular models the process of adaptation is comprised of a 
gradual evolution and reconstruction of one’s identity to accommodate the gained 
awareness of bodily changes and imposed functional limitations. Adaptation, therefore, 
does not follow a linear, ordered process but a complex, swing-like series of assimilated 
experiences and evolving emotions and cognitions.  
 In sum, then, the various sets of models of psychosocial adaptation differ from 
one another in their efforts to explain those psychological trajectories assumed to ensue 
following the onset of CID. The notion of time or, more specifically, that of experiential 
unfolding, accordingly, occupies a paramount role in the development of these 
models***.     
Time, Space and Change  
 Time, or more accurately the passage of time, can only be experienced through 
changes that occur within it (Cottle & Klineberg; 1974; Sherover, 1975; Whitrow, 
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1972/2003). Indeed, time has been referred to as the “gatekeeper” or “bookkeeper” of 
change (Greene, 2004). Regardless if these changes follow a repetitive (cyclical) or 
progressive (linear, unidirectional) trend, time nevertheless “binds the direction of 
change” (Sherover, 1975, p. 18). As such, time is intimately linked with the motion of 
causal ordering or sequencing, and with the concepts of developmental stages and 
unfolding growth processes. An inherent characteristic of time is therefore that it 
continually negates the present and creating past of it. This continuity of present negation 
is what causes change to occur and be perceived as such. Moreover, it negates the “no 
longer” actual past and similarly the “not yet” actual future (Georg Wilhelm Hegel, in 
Sherover, 1975). Other philosophers (e.g., Rudolf Hermann Lotze, Robin George 
Collingwood, in Sherover, 1975) have maintained that past and future do not really exist 
but are merely psychic projections or ideals of humans’ perception of the world around 
them. Only the present, as ephemeral as it may be, exists. Yet, the present is, 
undoubtedly, influenced by both past recollections and future expectations.    
Time, in its reflection of change through present negation and, therefore, 
sequencing of physical or mental events must also be directly linked to the concept of 
space (i.e., the external world) as the latter is the bedrock of all observed changes. Indeed, 
such joint time-space (often termed spacetime) attributions have been posited by 
philosophers (Kant, Locke, Leibnitz, Alexander), psychologists (Carl G. Jung, Kurt 
Lewin, Jean Piaget), and physicists (Paul Davies, Ernst Mach, Albert Einstein, Brian 
Greene). Locke and Leibnitz, for example, argued that time and space comprise the 
internal and inherent sequences of events located in the external world as we perceive it. 
Kant maintained a somewhat similar opinion, arguing that time and space establish the 
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boundaries within which all human perceptions are experienced and attain consciousness. 
Furthermore, Kant viewed time as the form of “inner sense” while space was seen as the 
form of “outer sense” in which all human consciousness takes place (Sherover, 1975). 
Similar views were voiced by Alexander who regarded time and space as “ontologically 
inseparable” (Sherover, 1975, p.175), together constituting the fundamental essence of 
the universe, namely, space-time. He went on to suggest that whereas space is the 
embodiment of stability and often even predictability, time is the creator of change, 
novelty, development, and therefore, unpredictability.    
CID implications. The most obvious implications of the concepts of time and 
space to understanding CID stem from the work of Kurt Lewin (1936, 1943). Lewin’s 
socio-psychological or “field” theory maintains that “any behavior or any other change in 
a psychological field depends only upon the psychological field at that time (Lewin, 
1943, p. 294, Italics in the original). Put differently, behavior refers to any change in the 
psychological field. Behavior (B) at a certain time (T) is, then, a function of the 
prevailing situation (S; at times referred to as E, the environment or the social 
environment) at that time only. The psychological field, therefore, is comprised of one’s 
simultaneous psychological past, present, and future (expectations, hopes, plans, fears, 
wishes, etc.), as experienced at a given time. This present-focused “principle of 
contemporaneity”, then, highlights the role of holistic interaction among simultaneous 
events that in turn produce a unique effect on behavioral outcomes (Lewin, 1936).   
These initial conceptualizations by Lewin were later applied to understanding the 
psychology of CID through the work of Roger Barker, Tamara Dembo, Gloria Levitan, 
and Beatrice Wright who collectively initiated the field of Somato-psychology during the 
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early 1950’s. In their work, these researchers argued that the person with CID encounters 
a more limited scope of his or her world (i.e., the world in which one functions becomes 
smaller). And accordingly, the influences of overt behaviors are restricted to these of a 
fewer number of people and physical conditions. They further claimed that future time 
perspective may be affected by the nature of the chronic illness (acute vs. chronic, life-
threatening vs. non life threatening) and its associated functional limitations such that 
acute and life threatening conditions, because of the urgency inherent in their very nature, 
invariably limits one future time perspective and, therefore, the ability to engage in long –
term planning (Barker, Wright, Meyerson, & Gonick, 1953/1977).  
A second application of the concept of space-time to CID can be found in the 
work of Beatrice Wright (1983), whose perspectives on value changes during the 
acceptance process of CID also invoke the concepts of temporality and the environment. 
For example, Wright’s “transforming comparative values into asset values” suggests that 
in order to successfully adapt to CID, a shift must occur whereby the person no longer 
focuses on outer-directed past comparisons (oneself to others) and instead emphasizes 
present strengths and abilities (inherent in oneself). Likewise, the “subordinating 
physique” tenet suggests a shift from emphasizing physical normalcy and prowess (past –
oriented) to non-physical values (spiritual, social, cognitive) and pursuits (present- and 
future-oriented).    
Finally, a further conceptual implication, related to time and change, stems from 
the work of Sprangers and Schwartz (1999; Schwartz & Sprangers, 1999) on “response 
shift”. Briefly, response shift reflects changes in the meaning assigned by the individual 
to self-assessment of certain psychological constructs such as quality-of-life (QOL). 
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These changes may result from: (a) a change in the individual’s internal standards of 
QOL measurement (i.e., scale recalibration); (b) a change in the individual’s values that 
indicate a change in the relative importance assigned to various QOL domains; or (c) a 
redefinition of the construct of QOL (re-conceptualization). It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to address the finer elements of the “response shift” model (the reader may refer to 
Bishop, Smedema, and Lee (2009) for a succinct yet excellent review of this model). 
However, even from the above cursory overview of response shift it should be evident 
that the concepts of time and change are dynamically interwoven into viewing how 
people with CID assess re-assess their QOL (including its components of life satisfaction 
and well-being) at different points throughout their lives following the onset of CID.  
Time in the Context of Personality Theories and TherapeuticApproaches  
 The concept of time, albeit only rudimentary explored, is nevertheless inherent in 
most personality and human behavior theories of the past one hundred years. The earlier 
mentioned time-linked concepts of linearity vs. cyclicality, objectivity vs. subjectivity, 
continuity vs. discontinuity, and reductionism vs. non-reductionism, can serve to better 
grasp differences among the conceptual underpinnings of personality theories. In this 
section, a brief description of several of the most prominent personality theories that 
serve as a backdrop to much of the clinical underpinnings of rehabilitation counseling 
and psychology practice as they, directly or indirectly, address time will be explored.    
Psychoanalysis. The work of Freud and his early followers strongly emphasized: 
1. The supremacy of the past or antecedent personal life experiences, in 
determining present cognitions, emotions, and perceptions. These are 
reflective of the primacy accorded earlier unconscious determinants 
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over later, consciously experienced events. Indeed, psychoanalytic 
treatment modalities seek to actively induce regression in the client. 
These modalities, further, refrain from setting time limits on the length 
of treatment. Coupled with the “timeless atmosphere” espoused by the 
free association technique, the client’s feelings and thoughts are 
consistently oriented toward the past (Masler, 1973; Namnum, 1972).    
2. The existence of a continuous, temporal sequence of psychosexual 
(Freud) and psychosocial (Erikson) stages of development. 
3. The gradual emergence of the ego, and later the superego, out of the 
formless id. Freud (1915/1953) and Bonaparte (1940) further 
maintained that the unconscious processes that are the hallmark of the 
id are timeless. It is the emergence of the ego, and later the superego, as 
autonomous systems of mental operations that are responsible for time 
conceptualization. The experience and pace of perceived time have also 
been linked to the lack of fulfillment of the id’s instinctual wishes (time 
moves slowly) and the harshness of the superego demands and 
expectations (time moves quickly) (Hartocollis, 1974, 1976; Rapaport, 
1951; Slife, 1993). 
These principles indicate that most forms of psychoanalytic-based theories regard 
time as a linear, mostly objective, and generally continuous process (Slife, 1993; 
Rapaport, 1951).  More recent developments within the field of psychoanalysis, ego 
psychology, and object relations, stemming from the contributions of such individuals as: 
M. Mahler, H. Kohut, J. Bowlby, K. Horney, E. Fromm, D. Rapaport, and R. Spitz, cast a 
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somewhat different light on the earlier, more orthodox conceptualizations. In these more 
recent contributions, the role afforded to strict temporal determinism of human behavior 
has been diminished and the objectivist view of childhood psyche has been rejected in 
favor of a more subjectivist one. In other words, these views acknowledge the importance 
of simultaneous, reciprocal influences of both interpersonal and environmental factors in 
shaping behavior (Slife, 1993).  
Psychoanalytic thinking posits that the origination of the sense of time can be 
traced to the nature of the infant-mother relationships (Edlund, 1987; Hartocollis, 1974; 
Mahler, 1975; Orgel, 1965; Rapaport, 1951; Schiffer, 1978). Furthermore, this imposed 
postponement of maternally-triggered gratification signifies the infant’s first experience 
of trauma and establishes the prototype for later experiences of trauma (Schiffer, 1978).  
The periodicity inherent in the hunger (frustration, abandonment) and satiation 
(gratification, stimulation) cycle that is linked to the absence or presence of the mother 
establishes the prototype of time experience for the infant (Edlund, 1987; Rapaport, 1951; 
Wallace & Rabin, 1960). The sense of subjective time, then, first emerges when the ego 
becomes capable of differentiating between present needs and future anticipation 
(Hartocollis, 1974). This acquired experience, therefore, creates a cyclical or pendular, 
rather than a linear flow of time for the infant. These early subjective experiences of time 
perception later pave the way to the development of a sense of objective time. The 
gradual acquisition of a sense of objective time is further bolstered during the “anal 
stage” of psychosexual development, during which the infant timing and increased 
control over the excretory functions gradually signal ego control over both the passage of 
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time and the external environment (Edlund, 1987; Fenichel, 1945; Freud, 1914/1953, 
1915/1953).    
Behavioral psychology. Orthodox behaviorism, as espoused by the work of 
Skinner, is firmly rooted in the Lockian tradition that views time objectively and linearly. 
It is based upon the Newtonian positivistic worldview and as such pays homage to time 
reductionism (Stimulus → Response chains), linearity (past experiences determine 
present behaviors), and temporal contiguity (environment antecedents directly influence 
emitted behaviors) (Slife, 1993; Maddi, 1989). In contrast to psychoanalytic models that 
espouse linear, temporal, stage-like, and psyche-based determinism, orthodox 
behaviorism discounts the role played by the stage-like, psychological-triggered, and in 
general, more complex models of linear time entrenched in the human mind. These 
Behaviorist views, instead, tend to assign greater weight to the influence of existing (at 
present) environmental-contextual factors and to more automated, psyche-free mediators 
of behavior in the stimulus-behavior chains (Melges, 1982).     
Cognitive psychology. Cognitive models of human functioning (including some 
cognitive-behavioral theories such as those proposed by Albert Ellis, Aaron Beck, and 
Albert Bandura), although still retaining some of the Newtonian time postulates, 
nevertheless embrace Kantian philosophy and as such place more emphasis on the role 
played by phenomenological aspects in influencing human experience. As such, these 
models deviate from strict adherence to time’s objectivity and linearity and allow for 
greater emphasis on subjective experience (the meditational role of cognitions) and 
nonlinearity (present perceptions and future expectations may also impact how the past is 
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being interpreted). As a result, the deterministic force inherent in the past is diminished 
(Slife, 1993; Ford & Urban, 1998). 
Humanistic and Existential Psychology. As  espoused by the works of such 
contributors as Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow, Rollo May, Victor Frankel, Irving Yalom, 
Medard Boss, Ludwig Binswanger and others, these views are derived from the Kantian 
tradition. They, therefore, embrace the role that subjective time plays in influencing the 
human experience. The belief in objective, as well as linear time is rejected in favor of 
that of such concepts as synchronicity (i.e., influences on psychological phenomena and 
processes can contemporaneous rather than solely past-determined), teleology 
(perceptions and meanings of currents phenomena can be caused by future intentions and 
goals), holism (the psyche or the internal world and the environment or the external 
world are simultaneous components of a holistic context), and transcendence (human are 
capable of self-transcendence and are able to exert their “free will” on the world), to 
name just a few (Ford & Urban, 1998; Maddi, 1989; Rychlak, 1988; Slife, 1993). Put 
differently, the role accorded to the past (and therefore to determinism) by earlier theories 
is minimized if not outright dismissed. The emphasis is on the present moment with 
acknowledgement of the potential contributions inherent in the future. Furthermore, it is 
the present, as subjectively experienced, and even the future, as subjectively anticipated, 
that exert influence on the past (Melges, 1982, Slife, 1993). Simple, reductionist, cause-
and-effect sequencing is denied. In a similar vein, the quantitative, continuous, and 
universal nature of time is rejected in favor of non-continuous, largely qualitative (i.e., 
meaningful, holistic, transcendent) interpretation of time (Slife, 1993).     
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In his detailed summary of the various psychological explanations that underlie 
the temporal paradigms previously discussed, Slife (1993) contrasts the following 
themes: 
1. The objectivity of time: Time as an objective standard for the 
measurement of psychological experiences vs. time as a context-bound 
experience where aspects of a dynamic past can be reconstructed from 
both present beliefs, attitudes, and environmental antecedents as well as 
expectations and hopes of the future.     
2. The continuity of time: Psychological change is continuous, and mostly 
linear-like in nature vs. change is not a direct reflection of linear and 
causal influences of past events and can often assume a discontinuous, 
abrupt, and even chaotic (e.g., therapeutic insights, psychotic 
breakdowns) nature. 
3. The linearity of time: Accurate explanations of present behaviors 
require that antecedent determinants are unearthed and examined vs. 
determinants of psychological processes and outcomes need not follow 
linear reasoning but could be simultaneous in nature, such as when both 
past experiences and future goals influence present perceptions and 
behaviors. According to the latter view, then, humans are not passive, 
simplistic or,  at best, reactive agents to past events but instead can also 
be active agents capable of certain degree of free will, individual 
choice, self-transcendence, and are therefore holistic, complex beings. 
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CID implications. Several implications of personality theory-driven concept of 
time to people with CID are noteworthy. First, a careful review of time within the 
psychodynamic model suggests: (a) the importance of the meaning of one’s past (prior to 
onset of CID) as reconstructed in the present (following the onset of CID) and the 
commensurate search for bringing pre-CID, unconscious meanings associated with 
health, holism, disability, sickness, pain, etc. under conscious control; (b) focusing on the 
process of mourning/grieving triggered by the loss of body parts and functions (past-
oriented search reenacted in the present); and (c) paying attention to the symbolic 
parallelism between present-experienced separation anxiety (stemming mostly from 
bodily losses and removal from familiar environmental settings)  and the prototypical 
roots of anxiety associated with separation from parental figures and other libidinal-
invested objects, as well as the often neglected yet potentially debilitating future-oriented 
anxiety that could threaten future relationships.  The process of adaptation to CID, 
therefore, reflects a symbolic transition from a “normal” or “whole” body, one that 
represented the past or the “former self”, into a new body, one that is indicative of the 
present (the “present self”) and is no longer “complete” or “whole”. Such a transition first 
requires acceptance of the loss and then a period of mourning for the lost of body 
integrity before mental and affective energies can be reinvested in a new and 
reconstructed self-image (Livneh & Siller, 2004; Slife, 1993).   
Although spanning a wide range of models and therapeutic interventions, from the 
more radical, orthodox, heavily-deterministic Skinnerian behaviorism that focuses 
exclusively on stimulus-response chains of observable behaviors to the more social-
cognitive model of Bandura that recognizes the important role played by cognitive 
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mediating processes, the behavioral approach, nevertheless, still espouses the learning 
model of human behavior. Also, since behavior is viewed as a function of its temporal 
and contextual (i.e., spatial) contingencies, therapeutic and rehabilitation modalities 
attempt to modify these earlier links by inducing novel temporal and contextual 
contiguities (e.g., repetitious exposure to environmental stimuli in order to minimize 
anxiety and avoidant behavior, re-enactment of behavioral chains to better master new 
behavioral patterns, progressive reshaping of desired target behaviors through selective 
schedules of reinforcement, remodeling of new actions, behaviors, and, if appropriate, 
thoughts). In accordance with these principles, temporal implications to the 
understanding the psychology of CID, as drawn from behavioral theory, suggest: (a) that 
observed CID-linked behaviors such as social withdrawal or aggressive acts and, if 
appropriate, inferred CID-associated thoughts, such as catastrophizing one’s condition or 
developing failure-prone cognitions, are analyzed as to their temporal (past-oriented) 
antecedents (trigger points) and contextually proximal (present-based) factors, both of 
which are primed by the rehabilitation professional for direct manipulation and 
reshaping; and (b) the need to apply techniques that seek to help the person with CID 
“unlearn” past connections between specific environmental stimuli and behaviors that are 
no longer appropriate or useful in the context of life with CID while at the same time 
learn new connections that successfully link present environmental stimuli and 
appropriately planned future behaviors, goals and plans (Slife, 1993; Stoll, 2004).     
Cognitive models of human behaviors and intervention modalities often overlap 
with those representing the social-cognitive pole of behavioral psychology (e.g., the 
contributions of Dollard and Miller, Bandura, Rychlak). The seminal work of such 
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individuals as Aaron Beck and Albert Ellis, however, deserves a mention on its own. 
Cognitive models, in the context of life with CID, typically focus squarely on the 
meditational role of cognitive schemata, such as belief systems and world views, as they 
relate to the impact of CID-triggered changes on one’s life. Although both Ellis and Beck 
advocate present-focused interventions, through the use of cognitive schemata to 
reconstruct present perceptions, their models indicate the recognition of a pseudo-linear 
chain of events, where the present “belief system” (e.g., the B in Ellis’ model) serves to 
mediate events of the past (antecedents or A) and the future (consequences or C). 
Moreover, since strict objective and linear temporal sequencing is rejected, and the 
subjectivity of human experience is valued, by these models, the influence of the past in 
these CID-triggered cognitive schemata is no longer viewed as the primary determinant 
of present efforts to adapt to CID. Instead, present perceptions and anticipation of future 
outcomes play a greater role in shaping cognitions and emotions that underlie the 
individual’s efforts to cope with the aftermath of CID. Accordingly, CID-oriented 
cognitive models suggest: (a) identification of present-focused dysfunctional or distorted 
cognitions (again, failure-prone assumptions), stemming from the onset of CID, that 
result in distressing emotions (e.g., anxiety, depression, anger) and maladaptive behaviors 
(e.g., withdrawal, avoidance, hostile actions); (b) implementation of cognitive 
restructuring and reframing interventions that seek to minimize presently-experienced 
feelings of anxiety and depression as well as related catastrophizing tendencies; and (c) 
assignment of homework activities to better plan for the future while taking into 
consideration its inevitable uncertainty and lack of cognitive structure (Garske & Bishop, 
2004; Slife, 1993; Swett & Kaplan, 2004).    
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The hallmark of humanistic and related phenomenological models of human 
existence is their present orientation. The focus is on concerns and issues that the 
individual (subjectively) experiences at the moment. With their departure from 
Newtonian time constraints and the embracing of time as a synchronous, psychologically-
influenced, and transcendental entity, these models view present experiences and 
phenomenological schemata as undeniably entrenched in past experiences as well as 
future hopes and expectations. The very nature of transcending clock time bestows the 
present with venues for freedom and choice and ultimately, the creation of meaning and 
acceptance of responsibility for one’s actions (Rychlak, 1988, Slife, 1993). The 
convenient separation of time into three distinct constituents of past, present, and future 
is, therefore, rejected in favor of a holistic, interactive mode of perceiving the world and 
coping with the experience of CID. As such, the influence of future meanings, hopes and 
expectations on past recollections and perceptions must be explored and understood. 
Psychosocial adaptation to CID is, accordingly, deeply entrenched in the individual’s 
phenomenological field and subjectively perceived self-regard. CID-oriented humanistic 
models therefore espouse: (a) the importance of present-focused phenomenological 
contexts and moments that underlie one’s CID-triggered experiences that result in a 
unique adaptation process where no two reactions (e.g., anxiety, depression, acceptance) 
are alike, thereby nullifying any semblance of stage or phase theories of adaptation; (b) 
the necessity, during therapeutic and rehabilitation discourses, of addressing existential 
topics that often stem from the onset of CID and include anxiety, death, isolation, grief, 
loneliness, and alienation; and (c) the need to carefully understand how the individual 
assimilates the meaning attached to the nature and impact of CID at every moment, and 
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how that ever-flowing search for meaning comes to influence perceptions of pain, 
functional limitations and death (Ososkie & Holzbauer, 2004; Slife, 1993).   
In sum, therefore, the above approaches, and other individual approaches not 
discussed in the present context (e.g., Jung’s Analytical Therapy, Adler’s Individual 
Therapy, Perls’ Gestalt therapy), with the possible exception of orthodox behaviorism, 
recognize the importance of subjective time in shaping human perceptions, orientations, 
and in general adaptation to life crises and misfortunes. Time flow, according to these 
approaches, is marked by its contemporaneous, recursive, and interactive nature of its 
constituents of past, present, and future. These various approaches, however, paint 
different shades of the psychosocial adaptation to CID landscape, its ostensible linearity, 
continuity, and universality. Yet, all these approaches recognize the relative importance 
of the subjectivity of perceptions of past events, such as the onset, nature, context and 
impact of the CID on one’s adaptive prowess. They also pay tribute to the complex, non-
linear, and often synchronous interaction between CID-triggered experiences and 
perceptions borne out of the past and their assimilation the present. Finally, they all 
acknowledge the capacity of future hopes, goals, and expectations (often referred to as 
teleological determinants) to influence past recollections of the CID experience as well as 
presently-assigned beliefs, meanings, cognitive schemata, and emotional tones.     
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 In Part II of this paper 
Time and Death 
 Over half a century ago, Heidegger posited that the inevitability of death lays the 
foundation to how humans perceive and experience time. Time has been described as 
“the arch enemy of all living” (Doob, 1971, p. 92) and the “enemy of man” (Frank, 1939, 
p. 293). Similarly, the American philosopher Dewey (1940) termed time as the 
“destroyer” while Seymour (2002) maintained that bodily deterioration and its eventual 
death are directly related to the flow of time. Time has also been reflected and 
symbolized in mythical figures such as “Father Time”, “The Grim Ripper”, etc., and as 
such has been both feared and hated (Ingram, 1979). It is of interest to also note that even 
the world of physics, the Second Law of Thermodynamics, often referred to as the Law 
of Entropy, indicates that all closed physical systems, with time, move into a greater state 
of entropy (or increased amount of disorder). Put differently, this process indicates the 
evolution of initially well-organized, dynamic systems (literally reflecting an active mode 
of functioning) into disorganized, lifeless systems as time goes on (Davies, 1995; Greene, 
2004).  
Indeed, for humans and most organic (as well as inorganic) matter time is firmly 
associated with decay and death. Time, therefore, is closely linked to the concept of 
mortality. Whitrow (1972/2003) maintained that humans’ awareness of their own 
mortality is linked to their existential anxiety of the passage of time and, therefore, is 
closely aligned with the unpredictability of the future. Hans Reichenbach (1956) also 
posited that an inescapable conclusion emanating from the irreversible flow of time is 
that gradual approach of death. Accordingly, he suggested, death anxiety transforms itself 
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into the fear of time. Similar sentiments were also expressed by Fraser (1975) who 
posited that the passage of time is intimately associated with the inevitability but 
unpredictability of death, thus necessitating mastery of future contingencies. The future 
is, then, the harbinger of feelings of anxiety while the past is more likely to offer a safe 
haven from such fears. The past, however, is not immune from lingering experiences of 
anxieties as is commonly observed in such conditions as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
and Dissociative Identity Disorder (previously known as Multiple Personality Disorder).  
 Yet, the fact that death is an outgrowth of human (and all living things) existence 
also suggests that death, being the negation of life, is therefore necessary for imbuing life 
with significance, meaning, and direction (Minkowski, 1970). Furthermore, the insatiable 
human need for denial of death (Becker, 1973, Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 
1997; Rank, 1932/1989), is what facilitates living “in the present” while, at the same 
time, planning for the future (Minkowski). Adopting a clinical view, Cohn (1957) and 
Orgel (1961), suggest that the rigid rituals commonly seen in people with obsessive-
compulsive disorders are a kind of “time machine” adopted to keep the notion of death in 
abeyance, thus warding off the finality of life.  
CID applications. The role that time plays in the context of death can be traced to 
the notion that CID has been symbolically equated, at least in the psychodynamic 
literature, with death and dying of certain body organs and functions (e.g., blindness as 
the “death of eyesight”; paralysis-linked spinal cord injury as the “death of mobility”; 
Chan, Livneh, Pruett, Wang, & Zheng, 2009; Livneh & Siller, 2004). If, indeed, certain 
forms of CID are symbolically reflective of death, then it could be argued that the onset 
of CID further nourishes the universal human fear of death and its symbolic association 
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with normal aging and the passage of time. Although much of the available literature in 
this field was spawned by research on attitudes toward people with CID, the very nature 
of psychosocial adaptation to CID suggests that coping with the aftermath of life-
threatening medical conditions (e.g., cancer, heart disease) embodies the concept of time 
and its psychological orientation. For example, the literature on coping with cancer 
frequently contrasts the impact of two sets of coping strategies. At one extreme we find 
fatalism (i.e., stoically accepting diagnosis and seeking no other information about 
condition or making no plans to confront its implications) and helplessness/hopelessness 
(i.e., engulfing oneself with the diagnosis and adopting a pessimistic attitude about 
survival). At the opposing pole we find the strategy of fighting spirit (i.e., being 
determined to fight illness by obtaining information and adopting optimistic attitude 
about its eradication). Cancer survivors who have engaged in efforts to combat the 
stressful impact of their condition, by demonstrating fighting spirit, have shown 
remarkable resilience in the face of their often bleak diagnosis. They have coped with 
their diagnosis and its implications by actively focusing on their present regimens and 
pursuing future plans to minimize its impact on their lives. In contrast, those who have 
passively accepted their condition as a “death sentence”, adopted a hopeless view of their 
future, and lacked the will to actively cope with their condition, were unable or failed to 
engage in present-focused efforts or set future goals to successfully combat their 
condition. Their view of time appears to be past-focused (“I’ve had a good life”) and 
future-truncated (“I avoid finding out more about it”) in its orientation (Greer & Watson, 
1987; Watson, Greer, Rowden, Gorman, Robertson, Bliss, & Tunmore, 1991).       
Time and Psychiatric Disorders    
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 A voluminous body of literature exists, that links time perception and/or time 
orientation with psychiatric disorders. The distortion of time perceptions, be it a 
contributing mechanism to the onset of psychiatric disorders, a correlate of their 
manifestation, or a by-product of their nature, is nevertheless an integral part of their 
symptomatology.  This body of literature can conveniently be discussed under four 
primary headings, namely (a) time perception and anxiety disorders, (b) time perception 
and mood disorders (mostly depression), (d) time perception and psychotic disorders 
(mostly schizophrenia and bipolar disorders), and (d) time perception and personality 
disorders (mostly antisocial personality disorder) (Cottle & Klineberg, 1974; Edlund, 
1987; Melges, 1982; Rappaport, 1990; Zimbardo & Boyd, 2008). It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to fully address the rich literature that was aggregated over the past 60 years. 
However, the present section seeks to provide the reader with a succinct overview of the 
major concepts and empirical findings drawn from the available literature.  
Time and anxiety disorders.   It has been long thought that images of and 
anticipation of future events carry profound influence on how individuals experience the 
present (Barlow & Durand, 2009; Cottle & Klineberg, 1974; Zimbardo & Boyd, 2008). 
When life events render the future unpredictable, uncontrollable, and mostly foreboding, 
increased levels of anxiety ensue and temporal integration is threatened (Cottle & 
Klineberg, 1974; Maslow, 1962; Melges, 1982). Threat and anxiety are, therefore, future-
oriented and efforts to manage anxiety may, therefore, focus on past time perception and 
less on future time perception (Krauss & Ruiz, 1967).  Empirical findings on the 
relationships between time perception and anxiety are scarce but appear to lend some 
support to these clinical observations. Krauss and Ruiz (1967) reported that scores on 
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anxiety were indeed negatively correlated with future time perception among hospitalized 
psychiatric patients. Terr (1983), in a sample of 30 children and adults who experienced a 
psychic trauma and exhibited a wide range of PTSD-related symptoms, found frequent 
alterations in perception and memory of time duration and a pronounced belief in 
foreshortened future perspective. Rappaport, Fossler, Bross, and Gilden (1993), reported 
that in a sample of older individuals, future time orientation (in the form of seeking 
meaningful and purposive future life possibilities) correlated negatively with death 
anxiety, suggesting that in older individuals with lower levels of death anxiety the ability 
to focus on the future was more intact.  
Time and mood disorders. Symptoms of depression commonly include these of: 
(a) Hopelessness and helplessness; (b) grief, mourning, and preoccupation with loss and 
failure; and (c) psychomotor retardation that is typically experienced also as a significant 
slowing of subjective time (Barlow & Durand, 2009; Edlund, 1987; Melges, 1982; 
Wyrick & Wyrick, 1977; Zimbardo & Boyd, 2008). Feelings of hopelessness point to a 
truncated or blocked future (occasionally referred to as foreshortened or constricted 
future time orientation; Gjesme, 1983; Melges, 1982). They also suggest disregard of 
future plans and goals (Orbach, 1975). Feelings of grief and loss suggest a 
disproportional focus on the past and its no longer available rewards. Brenner (1974) and 
Rappaport (1990) further argue that, in contrast to those who experience anxiety (i.e., the 
feeling that something bad is about to happen), people diagnosed with depression tend to 
focus on the past (i.e., something bad has already happened) while consideration of a 
positive past, and especially future, appears to be no longer a viable option to them. In a 
similar vein, their estimation of the passage of time is often faulty, such that time is 
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experienced to be passing too slowly. It is as if in depression the flow of time has slowed 
appreciably, even ceased its perceived forward movement completely or is even 
assuming a backward flow! (Rappaport). Empirical findings of these notions (Blewett, 
1992; Dilling & Rabin, 1967; Gil & Droit-Volet, 2009; Melges & Fougerousse, 1966; 
Tysk, 1984) indicate that the perception of the flow of time among people diagnosed with 
depressive disorders is, indeed, slowed down and may be, further, directly correlated with 
retarded psychomotor activity and altered level of physiological arousal.  
    Time and psychotic disorders. Psychotic disorders are commonly exemplified 
by bipolar disorders and the various types of schizophrenic disorders. In the former group 
of people with bipolar disorders, clinical reports (Edlund, 1987; Melges, 1982; Mezey & 
Knight, 1965; Tysk, 1984; Zimbardo & Boyd, 2008) have indicated that an opposite trend 
to that observed in people with depression where subjective time estimates appear to 
reflect the experience of rapid flow of time (e.g., racing thoughts) and an over-expansion 
of future time orientation (i.e., the individual’s span of awareness into the future). The 
latter group is marked by impaired reality testing, disorganized thinking and behavior, 
and inappropriate affect. Melges (1982), as well as other researchers (e.g., Edlund, 1987)  
of time perception among people with severe psychiatric disabilities argue that time 
distortion in these populations may be at the root of the symptoms encountered among 
people with these impairments. Entrenched in the symptoms that are associated with 
psychotic disorders is the collapse of the past (e.g., recollection of prior events) and the 
future (e.g., expectations of events) into the present. Present perceptions, therefore, 
appear to be timeless, and they are all experienced as equally real (Melges). Moreover, 
perceptions of inner events (recollections and expectations) are often confused with outer 
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events (ongoing perceptions triggered by environmental-based stimuli and events) 
(Melges). Time and space, as such, lose their defining dimensionality and are 
experienced in a disintegrated, fragmented, and dysfunctional manner. 
These distortions or disorganization of psychological (i.e., subjective) time 
typically encompass distortions of rate (duration), estimation, sequencing (ordering) of 
time, and temporal perspective. They are all manifestations of disorganized thinking 
(Lehman, 1967; Melges, 1982; Melges & Freeman, 1977; Zimbardo & Boyd, 2008). 
Indeed, the so called cognitive “primary processes”, those operating forces within the 
unconsciousness, that we all encounter during dream sequences and that are characterized 
by chaotic, diffuse, and disorganized mental images (unlike the more mature cognitive 
“secondary processes” of well-organized, reality-oriented thinking), strongly mimic the 
experience of timelessness noted in acute psychoses and infancy (Doob, 1971; Freud, 
1933/1965; Masler, 1973; Melges, 1982). Empirical findings (Braley & Freed, 1971; 
Densen, 1977; Dilling & Rabin, 1967; Johnson & Petzel, 1971; Melges, 1982; Wahl & 
Sieg, 1980) indicated that for a large number of people diagnosed with schizophrenia: (a) 
time was claimed to “stand still”; (b) clock and calendar time were inaccurately estimated 
(often overestimated); (c) future time orientation, as compared to that of non-impaired 
individuals, was of shorter duration, more incoherent, and mostly disorganized; and (d) 
experiences of timelessness and personal time fragmentation were evident. These 
manifestations of temporal disintegration have been observed in psychotic episodes such 
as failing to properly index the past, accurately perceive the present, and logically 
anticipate the future (Edlund, 1987; Melges, 1982). More recent research findings suggest 
that time perception distortions may be linked to more generalized lack of temporal 
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coordination in the brain and neuropsychological dysfunction (Carroll, Boggs, 
O’Donnell, Shekhar, & & Hetrick, 2008; Carroll, O’Donnell, Shekhar, & Hetrick, 2009; 
Lee, Bhaker, Mysore, Parks, Birkett, & Woodruff, 2009).  
Time and sociopathic personality disorders. Over half a century ago Cleckley 
(1959) maintained that criminals often fail in, and may even be incapable of, their efforts 
to pursue long-term goals in an organized, well-orchestrated manner. Cleckley, therefore, 
speculated that for these individuals a disruption in the processing of present needs and 
wishes occurs which then interferes with the capacity to envision future consequences. 
According to several theorists and clinicians (e.g., Melges, 1982; Smith, 1985; Wilson & 
Herrnstein, 1985), sociopathic behavior is characterized by foreshortened future time 
orientation or constricted “time horizon”. The present-oriented, impulsive efforts of 
sociopaths (nowadays typically categorized under the most severely impaired individuals 
with Antisocial Personality Disorder; APA, 2000), to obtain immediate gratification is 
linked to their inability to anticipate future events along with their consequences (both 
potential risks and rewards) (Melges, 1982). Empirical findings lent some support to 
these notions. Hartocollis (1972), for example, reported that on projective tests (e.g., 
Rorschach, TAT) patients diagnosed with antisocial personality disorders displayed 
limited awareness of time, most notably of the future and the past. Black and Gregson 
(1973) also observed a shorter time perspectives in a sample of prisoners when compared 
to a non-prisoner sample. Trommsdorff and Lamm (1980) observed that, among male 
adolescent delinquents, future time orientation was less differentiated, less extended, 
more pessimistic, and more internally-derived than that of non-delinquents. Lilienfeld, 
Hess, and Rowland (1996), albeit in a sample of undergraduate students, found that 
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measure of psychopathic personality/antisocial behavior were negatively correlated with 
self-report measures of future time orientation, thus lending further support to prior 
observations that antisocial tendencies may indeed be associated with the ability to 
successfully process perceptions of the future .     
Temporal Adaptation and coping 
 The concept of temporal adaptation has received only a scant treatment in the 
fields of health, psychology, and rehabilitation. In its broadest sense it may be 
conveniently regarded as occupying a continuum whose anchoring poles describe 
successful temporal functioning vs. temporal malfunctioning (Cottle & Klineberg, 1974; 
Kielhofner, 1977). The former pole refers to the capacity for a conscious, meaningful, 
flexible and balanced integration of past experiences and future expectations into present 
activities. The successful integration of these three temporal aspects is considered 
paramount to the continuity of life activities and is informed, among other factors, by 
situational necessities and available personal resources (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999, 2008). 
In contrast, the latter pole reflects poor ability to integrate these temporal aspects and 
results in unsuccessful efforts to organize life activities. It has also been extensively 
implicated in the development and maintenance of various psychiatric disorders 
(reviewed later in this paper).    
 Successful temporal adaptation is further imbued with such fundamental 
concepts as change (vs. immutability), evolution (vs. stagnation), and dynamics (vs. 
inertness). Indeed, its essence derives from the notion that adaptation is a continuous 
process that requires various internal (e.g., emotional, cognitive) and external (i.e., 
environmental) life adjustments over time and is not a single instant, static concept 
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(Vaillant, 1977; White, 1974). The capacity for temporal adaptation also suggests 
successful coping behaviors with stressful life events and is associated with positive self 
esteem (Zeidner & Saklofske, 1996). Although there have been many approaches to 
viewing and classifying coping (e.g., Carver, Scheier & Weintraub, 1989; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984; Tobin, Holroyd, Reynolds, & Wigal, 1989), the notion of temporality 
appears to fuel much of their content and functional ingredients. For example, in making 
a distinction between coping and defensive processes while adopting a psychodynamic 
approach, Haan (1977) argued that the ego processes inherent in defense mechanisms are 
mostly past-propelled and distort those psychological facets required for present 
functioning. In contrast, coping processes were viewed by her as future-oriented, while 
taking account of present needs and the reality of the present situation. In a somewhat 
similar manner, Nolen-Hoeksema and Larson (1994, 1999) carefully researched the non-
adaptive emotional-focused coping strategy of “rumination” (hers is a different approach 
to coping than Haan’s) and concluded that unmitigated rumination reflects “being stuck” 
in the past rather than moving forward toward acceptance of the stressful situation (e.g., 
loss of a loved one). Put differently, it is those negative memories from the past that 
result in viewing the present more negatively and in preventing active and adaptive 
problem solving from combating depression. A final example of the intimate link 
between coping and temporal orientation can be seen in the 5-tier phase classification of 
coping. According to this classification (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1997; Folkman & 
Moskowitz, 2004; Livneh & Martz, 2007; Schwarzer & Knoll, 2003), coping efforts can 
be directed towards: (a) long range anticipated future events (preventive or proactive 
coping) such as age-linked illnesses; (b) short range anticipated future events 
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(anticipatory coping) such as awaiting the results of potentially life-threatening diagnosis; 
(c) dynamic or crisis-like (present) situations such as facing intractable pain; (d) proximal 
(immediate) past events (reactive coping) such as the aftermath of a recent car accident; 
and (e) distal (remote) past events (residual coping) such as dealing with early life onset 
CID. The above brief review of the temporal aspects of coping is only meant to alert the 
reader to the importance of realizing the vital role that temporality plays in understanding 
the functions and contexts of coping.         
Time and psychosocial adaptation to CID 
 The subjectivity and relativity inherent in perceived (i.e., psychological) time are 
markedly influenced by a host of personal experiences and environmental conditions, 
including those associated with the onset, nature, progression, and treatment of CID 
(Livneh & Martz, 2007). Following the onset or diagnosis of CID, the individual must 
navigate among personal perceptions and recollections of the pre-CID past, current 
cognitive schemata including coping modalities and novel biochemical, physiological and 
physical experiences, as well as the uncertainty and unpredictability of the future. The 
impingement of these perceptual, motivational, cognitive and affective experiences, 
combine to impact time perception and orientation and, as a result, the process of 
adaptation to CID. As discussed earlier in this paper, gradual deterioration of bodily 
processes and functions, and ultimately the sentence of death, are inextricably linked to 
the passage of clock time. The onset of CID, however, embodies an unexpected 
discontinuity in the normal progress of physical aging (Seymour, 2002). CID, therefore, 
disrupts the passage of both physical and psychological time, results in disorganization of 
temporal adaptation, and is a concrete testament to the vulnerability of the human body 
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(Keilhofner, 1975; Seymour, 2002). With its associative symbolism of death, time 
assumes a far more urgent role in the lives of people with CID (Adam, 1990; Seymour, 
2002). Indeed, Seymour maintained further that “living with a disability is living a life 
dominated by time” (p. 138).  
 The notion that normal time flow is disrupted by the onset of CID further suggests 
the following corollaries. First, with the disruption of the passage of time the individual’s 
future time perspective, along with personal expectations, hopes, and wishes is likely to 
undergo a foreshortened flow of time since the future is no longer a “safe place” for 
psychological dwelling (Kielhofner, 1977; Lilliston, 1985). Second, with distorted time 
flow, uncertainty about and unpredictability of one’s future, even the proximal future, 
permeate the entire process of psychosocial adaptation to CID (Seymour, 2002). Third, 
with the impact of traumatic CID, the subjective experience of time becomes mostly 
present-oriented with time flow moving gradually slower (recall discussion of depression 
and the perception of time). Further, leading to temporal disorientation are the often 
associated experiences of pain, the disruption of the normal sleep/wake cycle, and 
preoccupation with present bodily sensations and functions (Lilliston, 1985). Fourth, with 
the resultant uneven temporal flow, the onset of sudden CID frequently leads to 
distortions of “daily life spaces” because of both the amount of time that is now 
demanded to accomplish daily activities and the imposed necessity for domestic, social, 
and vocational changes (Keilhofner, 1977). Fifth, if following the aftermath of sudden 
onset CID (e.g., SCI, TBI) treating the condition necessitates acute care environment, the 
affected individual is likely to experience disorientation in time and space because of 
severe mobility restrictions, continuous sensory deprivation, side effects of medication, 
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and interrupted sleep-wake cycle associated with the dispensation of various medical 
procedures and regimens (Trieschmann, 1988). Finally, since time can be regarded as the 
mediator between past health status (e.g., wellness, physical intactness, order) and the 
present CID (e.g., illness, disorder status, chaos), it is also capable of mediating between 
present feelings of experienced emotional turmoil and the reconstruction of an ordered 
and more controllable future. Indeed, the ensuing rehabilitation process following the 
onset of CID may be viewed as the re-embracement of time (Adam, 1990, Seymour, 
2002).    
 Unlike the large body of literature aggregated over the past several decades on the 
relationships between time orientation and/or time perspective (the two are inexplicably 
treated interchangeably in the empirical literature on CID) and psychiatric disabilities, 
empirical data on time orientation and perspective, and psychosocial adaptation to 
physical CID are scarce at best. In the following paragraphs an attempt is made to 
summarize these findings. Before doing so, however, it is important that the reader 
becomes acquainted with those instruments typically applied to measuring time.  
The two most frequently used measures are (a) the Zimbardo Time Perspective 
Inventory (ZTPI; Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999), and the Future Time Orientation Scale 
(FTOS; Gjesme, 1979). The former measure is a 56-iten questionnaire that is composed 
of five scales that depict the respondent’s preference for experiences that are temporally-
related (past, present, or future time). Past perspective is divided into two scales, namely, 
Past Negative (i.e., reflecting an aversive view of the past) and Past positive (i.e., 
indicating a positive recollection of the past). Present perspective is also broken town into 
scales. These are Present Fatalistic (i.e., characterized by resignation toward fate and 
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holding mostly a negative orientation toward the present), and Present Hedonistic (i.e., 
depicting a pleasure-oriented, risk-taking attitude toward present life). Finally, the Future 
scale reflects a goal-oriented attitude toward the future. The second measure, FTOS, is a 
14-item instrument that focuses on the respondent’s general concern and personal 
involvement with the future. Lower scores are typically indicative of foreshortened sense 
of future while higher scores suggest greater orientation toward the future. In addition to 
these two measures, other instruments have been also infrequently used to address 
temporal orientation. These include researcher-developed (a) projective scales such as 
story telling/writing measures, and (b) ad hoc temporally-constructed items selected 
specifically for that study.            
Past time orientation/perspective and adaptation to CID. As discussed above, 
according to Zimbardo and Boyd (1999, 2008), past time orientation can take the form of 
either positive or negative valence****. Two studies reported findings on the relationship 
between scores on the ZTPI and psychosocial adaptation to CID. Hamilton, Kives, 
Micevski, and Grace (2003), in a sample of older people with cardiac disease, reported 
that participants who scored higher on positive past orientation also engaged in more 
health-promoting lifestyle activities and experienced higher levels of spiritual growth. In 
contrast, those individuals who scored higher on negative past orientation coped poorly in 
managing their stress. In a sample of people with diabetes, Livneh and Martz (2007) 
found that positive past orientation was associated with lower levels of anxiety and 
depression and also with higher levels of psychological adjustment, while negative past 
orientation was related to higher levels of depression and anger. Finally, in a 
comprehensive study that sought to examine temporal orientation among people who 
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experienced major life traumas (i.e., adult women who experienced childhood incest, war 
veterans, and survivors of fire-damaged residences), and using responses to open-ended 
semi-structured questionnaire, Holman and Silver (1998) reported that participants who 
were past-oriented, also experienced higher levels of distress. An additional observation 
of interest was that past orientation was linked to temporal disintegration at the time of 
the traumatic experience. Put differently, those for whom, during the traumatic insult, 
present perceptions were isolated from both the past and the future (and thus experienced 
interference with normal assimilation of the traumatic event into their ongoing mental 
processes) were found to be “stuck” in the past and experience higher levels of distress. 
Present time orientation/perspective and adaptation to CID. As discussed, present 
time orientation has also been divided into two separate, affectively-based dimensions by 
Zimbardo and Boyd (1999, 2008), namely, pleasure-oriented or hedonistic and 
resignation-oriented or fatalistic. In their study, Hamilton et al. (2003) found that among 
cardiac rehabilitation patients present hedonistic orientation was positively associated 
with health-promoting practices and more intimate interpersonal relations. Livneh and 
Martz (2007), investigating the relationships between time orientation and psychosocial 
adaptation in a sample of people with diabetes, reported that hedonistic present 
orientation was positively and significantly related to successful adjustment while 
fatalistic present orientation was positively and significantly linked to measures of 
anxiety, depression and anger, and negatively to psychological adjustment. Using items 
derived from the Hypertension Temporal Orientation scale (Brown & Segal, 1996), and 
adopting these items to experiences by individuals diagnosed with osteoarthritis, Alberts 
and Dunton (2008) examined the relationships between time orientation and illness 
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management strategies. Results demonstrated that among older women with 
osteoarthritis, focus on the present was associated with less proactive illness management 
coping (i.e., fewer efforts at planning for future benefits) and greater reliance on reactive 
coping strategies to manage the illness and its symptoms (i.e., focusing mostly on 
immediate benefits to remove threats and improve symptoms).  
Future time orientation/perspective and adaptation to CID. FTO guides many of 
our psychological processes and functions and is further associated with the development 
and maintenance of mental health, life satisfaction and perceived well-being (Holman & 
Silver, 1998; Lewin, 1943; Melges, 1982).   Reasonable FTO affords the individual the 
ability to engage in preparatory behaviors during the present; however when the 
individual’s focus is on the highly remote future the needed present urgency and potency 
of planning for the future may be lost (Frank, 1939). FTO may not represent a unitary 
construct but may be comprised of at least two independent aspects, namely, extension 
and coherence (Wallace & Rabin, 1960). Whereas the former refers to the quantitative 
length or span of projected FTO, the latter refers to the logical structure or organization 
of anticipated events during the future. Three essential factors that have been introduced 
to explain FTO development include: motives (motivational), delay of gratification 
(impulse control/affective), and ability to use symbols to conceptualize the future 
(cognitive) (Gjesme, 1983; Heckhausen, 1977; Nuttin, 1985). FTO, then, refers to the 
degree of involvement in the future; it is a set of subjective expectations and beliefs about 
one’s future. 
In one of the earliest studies that sought to examine the role played by FTO in 
coping with CID, Agrawal and Pandey (1998) obtained data from a sample of 22 women 
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diagnosed with a variety of chronic conditions including cancer, diabetes, cardiovascular 
diseases, and asthma. FTO was assessed with a combined approach of story writing 
technique and a semantic differential scale. Results showed that FTO was positively 
related to measures of optimism, life satisfaction and adaptive coping strategies (e.g., 
acceptance, planning, positive reinterpretation). Similar findings were reported by 
Anubhuti (2008), also using a semi-projective technique of story writing to assess FTO. 
In that study, 30 individuals with Type II diabetes provided data on quality of life (QOL) 
and life satisfaction. Those who with higher scores of FTO also reported high levels of 
life satisfaction and perceived social support (one of the QOL measure subscales). The 
author interpreted these findings as suggesting that the cognitive and motivational aspects 
of FTO are associated with such personal attributes as hope and optimism, thus resulting 
in greater perceived life satisfaction. 
In their study of individuals who underwent cardiac rehabilitation, Hamilton et al. 
(2003) reported that those who scored higher on the ZTPI Future Scale also engaged in 
more responsible health promoting behaviors. This relationship, however, was no longer 
statistically significant once socio-demographic variables (e.g., chronological age) were 
controlled for. The authors posited, based on the totality of their findings, that the reason 
FTO failed to successfully predict indicators of psychosocial adaptation to cardiac 
condition (i.e., spiritual growth, stress management and interpersonal relations) stems 
from the fact that the daily stressful experiences typically associated with cardiac disease 
and the accompanying threat to life, truncate both future and present time perspectives, 
and concomitantly increase cognitions about the past. This increased attention to the past 
is seen as reflective of efforts to reaffirm feelings of intrinsic value of one’s life, 
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especially among elderly cardiac populations. Martz (2004) studied psychosocial 
predictors of FTO among 317 veteran and civilian with SCI. Her results indicated that the 
three most salient predictors were those of depression (associated with foreshortened 
FTO), shock (defined as experiencing feelings of psychic numbness and disorganization 
during the time of the injury; associated with foreshortened FTO), and acknowledgement 
(defined as cognitive acceptance of disability; associated with lengthened FTO). In a 
related study, Martz and Livneh (2003), analyzing data from the same sample of SCI 
survivors, further found that truncated FTO was also predicted by increased levels of 
death anxiety and experienced pain after controlling for the influence of socio-
demographic (i.e., gender, age, marital status, education) and disability-related (i.e., 
existence of pressure sores, duration of disability) variables.  
Chalfant, Bryant, and Fulcher (2004) examined the prevalence of PTSD in a 
sample of 58 individuals diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. Although no specific time 
orientation measures were directly used, from their access to participants’ audiotaped 
reports, the authors categorized re-experiencing symptoms as either past- or future-
oriented. Results showed that a foreshortened sense of future orientation was the most 
predictive symptom of PTSD in this sample. The authors argued that individuals with MS 
who are threatened by their unpredictable medical condition may also be susceptible to 
experiencing PTSD. Research based on a sample of 105 individuals diagnosed with 
diabetes by Martz and Livneh (Martz & Livneh, 2007; Livneh & Martz, 2007), further 
demonstrated that FTO is negatively related to feelings of anxiety, depression and also 
anger, while positively associated with successful psychosocial adjustment to SCI. 
Moreover, FTO was also found to be negatively correlated with all three subscales (re-
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experiencing, hyper-arousal, and avoidance) of the Purdue Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder-Revised (PPTSD-R) Scale (Lauterbach & Vrana, 1996), although only scores 
from the latter subscale reached statistical significance level. Finally, in their study of 
women with osteoarthritis, Alberts and Dunton (2008), findings revealed that women 
scoring higher on FTO engaged in more planned proactive and preventive behaviors to 
manage their illness and resorted to fewer reactive efforts at illness management (focused 
less on only immediate symptom reduction).                                               
Treatment Modalities and Time Distortions  
 Reactions of depression and anxiety have been frequently reported to be a linked 
to the onset of CID (Lee, Chan, Chronister, Chan, & Romero, 2009; Livneh & Antonak, 
1997; Shontz, 1975). As was discussed earlier, these reactions are often associated with 
distortions of both past and future time perceptions. To combat disordered time 
orientations and perceptions, several approaches have been suggested in the literature. 
These include: 
1. “Unfreezing the Future” (Melges, 1982, chapter 9). This approach is directed at 
helping depressed clients focus more on the immediate present and the near 
future. The client is directed toward combating his or her feelings of hopelessness 
and, in general, inducing positive expectations about the future into their 
cognitive schemata.  
2. Time projection (Melges, 1982, chapter 6). Having the client project thoughts into 
the past (by reliving certain past life episodes), but especially toward the future 
(by visualizing specific future time frames as if they were occurring at the 
moment), can be beneficial in helping the client to gain a more comprehensive 
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temporal perspective on the source of his or her difficulties and their possible 
future ramifications. 
3. Temporally-oriented psychotherapy (Rappaport, 1990). This approach, although 
only rudimentary developed and borrowing heavily from other psychodynamic 
therapeutic modalities, attempts to integrate all three time zones (i.e., it is based 
on the premise that temporal zones form “irreducible synergism” (Rappaport, p. 
189). As such, it addresses all temporal zones in concert, typically by first 
focusing on the client’s current life issues and then proceeding forward (i.e., 
“unblocking the future”) and backward (uncovering sources of anxiety, 
depression, etc.).  
4. Temporal awareness shifting (Silver, Boon, & Stones,1983). With the use of this 
approach clients are directed to learn how to consciously shift attention away 
from distressing past life events and replace them with focused outlook on present 
opportunities for growth in order to maximize adaptive functioning.  
5. Proactive illness management (Alberts & Dunton, 2008). Individuals who are 
mostly present-oriented could benefit from a therapeutic approach that is geared 
toward managing their CIDs more proactively. Included in this approach are such 
venues as focusing on future benefits and on important life goals yet to be 
accomplished.  
Conclusion 
 A review of the available theoretical, clinical and empirical literatures on time and 
psychosocial adaptation to CID suggests the following. First,  
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*No elaboration on the scientific accuracy of the concept of “Newtonian” or linearly-
rigid time is pursued in this paper. As most readers are well aware of, “Einstein’s 
time”, first espoused by him during his “Special Theory of Relativity”, introduced the 
concept that the flow of time is relative to the observer and to his or her motion 
within space such that time slows down as a function of the observer’s increased 
speed (Davies, 1995). Furthermore, time also slows down as a function of increased 
force of gravity (“General Theory of Relativity”), such that time comes to a virtual 
standstill in the presence of enormous gravity pull as is experienced in the vicinity of 
such objects as black holes. 
** The “big bang” and its companion the “big crunch” models are based on cyclical, 
repetitive assumptions of time progression while the “heat death” model is anchored 
in the belief that the universe will continue its expansion forever, resulting in a state 
of maximum entropy.     
***Although implied in both sets of models is the notion of temporal evolvement, 
neither model fully addresses the notion of spacetime and certainly both are remiss in 
incorporating spatial elements into their theoretical fabric. Other models, notably 
termed “ecological”, “interactive” or “reciprocal” models (for review the reader may 
consult such sources as Livneh & Parker, 2005, Livneh & Bishop, 2011, and 
Smedema et al., 2009) are more cognizant of environmental influences and their role 
in psychosocial adaptation to CID. 
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****Although this harsh dichotomy appears at first blush to be a bit unsettling and 
simplistic, in the context of the ZTPI’s continuous scoring on each of these 
scales/dimensions a more realistic view of each time orientation is achieved.   
   
